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ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY--CONTINGENCY
FEES-AN ATTORNEY'S RIGHT OF RECOVERY WHEN DISCHARGED FROM A
CONTINGENT FEE CONTRACT IN ARKANSAS. Salmon v. Atkinson, 355 Ark.
325, 137 S.W.3d 383 (2003).
I. INTRODUCTION
Contingent fees compensate attorneys for their services by awarding
attorneys a share of the plaintiff's recovery.' The primary advantage of the
contingent fee is that it allows a person of modest means to obtain legal
services. 2 Contingent fee contracts become problematic when clients dis-
charge their attorneys. Questions then arise as to what, if any, compensation
the attorneys are entitled to receive for services rendered and, if the attor-
neys are entitled to compensation, when the cause of action to recover such
compensation accrues. In the case of Salmon v. Atkinson, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court considered these questions when it addressed the issue of
"[w]hether an attorney who enters into a contingent fee contract with a cli-
ent and is later discharged by the client may bring an action for a quantum-
meruit fee prior to the resolution of the former client's lawsuit." 3
In addressing the question presented in Salmon, this note examines the
facts of the case, focusing on the events that brought the parties into court,
what the parties sought in court, and the procedural history of the case lead-
ing up to the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision.4 This note delves into the
historical background of the contingent fee by exploring its evolution under
English common law.5 Then the focus shifts to the historical development
of contingent fees within the United States, 6 followed by a detailed evolu-
tion of contingent fees within Arkansas exploring all the components
thereof.7 Finally, this note provides a synopsis and background of the bodies
of law that the court considered in its holding in Salmon.
8
This note then sets forth the reasoning of the majority and the concur-
ring opinion in Salmon.9 Then this note explores the significance of the
court's decision in Salmon, focusing on how the court's holding affects the
Arkansas Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Arkansans's access to
1. JoHN W. TOOTHMAN & WILLIAM G. Ross, LEGAL FEES LAW AND MANAGEMENT 159
(2003).
2. Id. "[I]n our heart of hearts we know that 90 percent of the American people cannot
afford to pay lawyers by the clock." Id. (quoting Arthur R. Miller, Maybe Light at the End of
the Tunnel: Is the Litigation Explosion Imploding?, 61 DEF. CouN. J. 378, 379 (1994)).
3. 355 Ark. 325, 326, 137 S.W.3d 383, 383 (2003) (italics omitted).
4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part III.A. 1.
6. See infra Part III.A.2.
7. See infra Part III.B.
8. See infra Part III.C.
9. See infra Part IV.
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the courts.' 0 Finally, the note sets forth a proposed rule aimed at alleviating
the problematic ramifications of the court's decision in Salmon. "
II. FACTS
On June 19, 2000, Joy Salmon hired Atkinson Law Offices on a con-
tingency fee basis to pursue a claim for damages against the estate of
George Brown.' 2 Salmon lived with Brown for some time prior to Brown's
death and provided care for him in a nursing capacity.' 3 Salmon believed
that she was the widow of Brown and that his heirs were mistreating her,
and thus, Salmon wanted to bring suit against the estate. 14 The Atkinson
Law Offices took the case and entered into a contingent fee contract with
Salmon, whereby the Atkinson Law Offices would take fifty percent of any
recovery plus costs, and in the event of no recovery, no fee was due.' 5
James Howell, who had recently graduated from law school, began
work on the case under the supervision of Atkinson.' 6 The Atkinson Law
10. See infra Part V.
11. See infra Part V.
12. Salmon v. Atkinson, 355 Ark. 325, 326, 137 S.W.3d 383, 383 (2003). This was the
first time that Salmon had met Atkinson's associate, James Howell. Appellants' Brief at 1,
Salmon v. Atkinson, 355 Ark. 325, 137 S.W.3d 383 (2003)(No. 03-535).
13. Salmon, 355 Ark. at 326, 137 S.W.3d at 383. In June of 2000, Salmon told Atkin-
son, Howell, and Connie Dejesus, a part-time receptionist for the Atkinson Law Offices, that
she was a registered nurse. Appellants' Brief at 1, 4, Salmon (No. 03-535).
14. Appellants' Brief at 1, Salmon (No. 03-535).
15. Salmon, 355 Ark. at 326, 137 S.W.3d at 383. The Atkinson Law Offices took the
case on a contingent fee basis because Salmon told them that she did not have any money,
and they believed that she did not have any money and was living on the street. Appellants'
Brief at 1, 3, Salmon (No. 03-535). The contingent fee contract form reads as folows:
This contract and agreement made and entered into by and between the under-
signed client and Atkinson Law Offices ....
WHEREAS, client has a claim or demand against Joy Salmon (Brown) and pos-
sibly others now unknown ....
IT IS UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
In consideration of the services rendered and to be rendered by Atkinson Law
Offices, client agrees that the Atkinson Law Offices shall receive for their ser-
vices 50% of any amount that is recovered ... after deducting court costs and
other legal expenses ....
It is understood that in the event of no recovery, no fee shall be charged by At-
kinson Law Offices.
Id. at 31, Salmon.
16. Appettants' Brief at I, Salmon (No. 03-535). Atkinson said that Howell was a new
attorney and had a lot of free time. Id. at 2. Howell received his Juris Doctor from the Uni-
versity of Arkansas at Little Rock in 1999 and obtained admission to the Arkansas Bar that
same year. MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY AR47P (Reed Elsevier, Inc. 2004).
Atkinson received her Juris Doctor from the University of Arkansas and obtained admission
to the Arkansas Bar in 1955. Id. at AR24P.
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Offices began work on Salmon's case by interviewing multiple witnesses,
researching Salmon's claim that she was Brown's wife, researching the
general law, and negotiating with the estate of Brown.' 7 In their research,
they discovered that Salmon was not Brown's wife.18 Even so, Atkinson
Law Offices believed that Salmon had a valid claim for four million dollars
against the estate of Brown for the care Salmon provided to Brown prior to
his death. 9 Supported by their research and investigation, Howell, under the
supervision of Atkinson, drew up a petition for Salmon to file in the probate
case.
20
In late July of 2000, Atkinson Law Offices presented the petition to
Salmon for her signature, but Salmon said she wanted to think about filing
the claim and left the law offices with the petition.2 1 The next communica-
tion the Atkinson Law Offices received from Salmon was a note dated Au-
gust 1, 2000,22 in which Salmon wrote, "I am writing to inform you that I
am terminating your services effective immediately., 23 In response, Howell,
at the direction of Atkinson, sent a letter to Salmon dated August 21, 2000,
billing Salmon for forty-eight hours at the customary billing rate of $150 an
hour for a total of $7200 for services rendered.24 The letter also stated that
Salmon must file her claim against the estate of Brown by September 1,
2000.25 On September 1, 2000, Salmon filed a petition against the Brown
26estate pro se, raising the same issues that the Atkinson Law Offices had
intended to raise on her behalf.
27
17. Salmon, 355 Ark. at 327, 137 S.W.3d at 384.
18. Id.
19. Id. The Atkinson Law Offices talked to Virgil Young, the attorney for the executor
of the Brown estate, and thought that Young might make them an offer, but this did not ma-
terialize into a settlement. See Appellants' Brief at 2, Salmon (No. 03-535).
20. Salmon, 355 Ark. at 327, 137 S.W.3d at 384.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Appellee's Brief at 8, Salmon v. Atkinson, 355 Ark. 325, 137 S.W.3d 383 (2003)
(No. 03-535).
24. Salmon, 355 Ark. at 327, 137 S.W.3d at 384; Appellants' Brief at 2, 34, Salmon
(No. 03-535). Atkinson Law Offices performed services for Salmon from June 19 to July 31
of 2000, Salmon, 355 Ark. at 327, 137 S.W.3d at 384, but has no records of time spent on
Salmon's claim, Appellants' Brief at 2, Salmon (No. 03-535). Atkinson stated that forty-
eight hours was a conservative estimate of time spent. Id. at 3. Additionally, Dejesus, the
Atkinson Law Offices' part-time receptionist, said that Salmon visited frequently, meeting
with Howell for thirty minutes or more. Id. at 4.
25. Salmon, 355 Ark. at 327, 137 S.W.3d at 384; Appellants' Brief 34, Salmon (No. 03-
535).
26. Salmon, 355 Ark. at 327, 137 S.W.3d at 384; Appellants' Brief at 32-33, Salmon
(No. 03-535). Atkinson testified that Salmon's claim "embodies all of the things we dis-
cussed and all of the avenues we pursued to try to recover something for her." Salmon, 355
Ark. at 330, 137 S.W.3d at 386.
27. Salmon, 355 Ark. at 330, 137 S.W.3d at 386.
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On May 21, 2001, Atkinson and Howell filed a complaint in the Cir-
cuit Court of Pulaski County against Salmon praying for $7200 plus interest
and costs for services rendered prior to their discharge by Salmon.28 The
complaint alleged that Salmon utilized Atkinson's and Howell's services
with full understanding of their expectation of payment and that Salmon
was liable for the reasonable value of the services in quantum meruit.29 On
June 14, 2001, Salmon, represented by Alston Jennings of Wright, Lindsey,
and Jennings, L.L.P., filed her Answer stating that she had never received a
settlement or judgment on her claim, which was a condition precedent to
Plaintiffs receiving a fee for their services 30 as stated in the contract into
which the parties entered.31
On December 3, 2002, the case went before a jury of six members, and
the jury returned a verdict in favor of Atkinson and Howell in the amount of
$7200.32 On December 4, 2002, Salmon filed a motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict, arguing that the contingent fee contract provided
that "in the event of no recovery no fee shall be charged" and, because there
was not yet a recovery on the claim, the jury verdict could not be supported
by substantial evidence.33 On December 17, 2002, the court denied Defen-
dant's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, finding that there
was substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict. 34 That same day the
judge entered an order stating that Atkinson and Howell recover $7200 from
Salmon. 35 Refusing to accept the verdict, Salmon filed a motion for new
trial on January 2, 2003, and renewed her Motion for Judgment Notwith-
standing the Verdict.36 On February 4, 2003, the judge denied the motions
without written explanation.37
28. Appellants' Brief at 13, Salmon (No. 03-535).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 15. The judge denied the motion for summary judgment that Salmon filed with
her Answer. Id. at 5.
31. Id. at31.
32. Id. at 5. At the close of the evidence, Salmon's attorney moved for a directed ver-
dict. Id. The motion was unsuccessful. Id. Salmon, represented by cotmsel, did not attend the
trial. Appellee's Brief at 3, Salmon v. Atkinson, 355 Ark. 325, 137 S.W.3d 383 (2003) (No.
03-535).
33. Salmon v. Atkinson, 355 Ark. 327, 137 S.W.3d 383, 384 (2003). Plaintiffs pre-
sented a proposed judgment after the jury verdict. Appellants' Brief at 19, Salmon (No. 03-
535). On December 9, 2002, Salmon objected to the proposed judgment, stating that her
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict was still pending. Id.
34. Appellants' Brief at 21, Salmon (No. 03-535).
35. Id. at 22.
36. Id. at 24. Salmon reasoried that the judgment could not stand on the basis of contract
law because the condition precedent for any right to fees had not occurred and that the judg-
ment was unsupported by competent evidence. Id. at 25. Salmon's basis for a new trial was
the improper denial of motions for a directed verdict, improper jury instructions, and an error
in admission of evidence concerning Plaintiff's time spent and activities performed on
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On February 28, 2003, Salmon filed a notice of appeal.38 On appeal,
Salmon argued that the trial court was in error because a "discharged attor-
ney's cause of action does not accrue unless and until the client is successful
in recovering an award., 39 Atkinson Law Offices argued in the converse
that a discharged attorney may recover in quantum meruit prior to the dis-
charging client's successful recovery of an award.4 °
III. BACKGROUND
The contingent fee issue that the court considered in Salmon v. Atkin-
son41 developed over a long period of time.42 This section explores the his-
torical evolution of the contingent fee, tracing its development to the ques-
tion the court considered in Salmon.43 In exploring the evolution of the con-
tingent fee, this section reviews the historical background of the prohibition
of contingent fees under English common law, focusing on the law against
champerty. 44 Then the focus shifts to the initial prohibition of contingent
fees and their eventual acceptance within the United States. 45 Next, this
section provides a detailed evolution of the contingent fee within Arkansas,
while exploring all the components thereof,46 followed by a synopsis and
background of the bodies of law that the court considers in its holding47 in
Salmon.48
A. Historical Development
"Under early English and Roman law, advocates arguing before courts
were not entitled to compensation for their services, although they could
Salmon's case. Id. at 26.
37. Id. at 28.
38. Id. at 29.
39. Salmon v. Atkinson, 355 Ark. 325, 326, 137 S.W.3d 383, 383 (2003).
40. Appellee's Brief at 3, Salmon v. Atkinson, 355 Ark. 325, 137 S.W.3d 383 (2003)
(No. 03-535).
41. 355 Ark. at 326, 137 S.W.3d at 383.
42. Kenneth B. Hughes, The Contingent Fee Contract in Massachusetts, 43 B.U. L.
REV. 1, 3 (1963).
43. See infra Parts III.A-C.
44. See infra Part III.A. 1.
45. See infra Part III.A.2.
46. See infra Part III.B.
47. See infra Part III.C.
48. 355 Ark. 325, 137 S.W.3d 383 (2003).
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accept donations. ' ' 9 Today, while such extreme restrictions are no longer
prevalent, almost every nation prohibits the use of contingent fees.50
1. Champerty51 and Its Restriction of the Contingent Fee
In early England, the contingent fee, traditionally considered both ille-
gal and unethical, violated the law against champerty,52 which restricted a
person from supporting a lawsuit for a share of the expected recovery.53
The English law of champerty developed from the English law of
maintenance,5 4 a law that forbids assistance in prosecuting or defending a
suit by someone who has no bona fide interest in the action.15 The law of
maintenance can be traced back no further than the end of the eleventh cen-
tury when William the Conqueror invaded England and divided the land of
the natives into sixty-thousand knights' fees.56 The law of maintenance as-
sured that the conquered poor had limited means to seek redress in a court
of justice for the taking of their land because they lacked the education,
money, and right to transfer the suit to one who had the abilities and means
to pursue it.
57
By 1275 the law against champerty amended the law of maintenance
stating, "No minister of the King shall maintain pleas, suits or matters de-
pending in the King's courts for lands, tenements or other things, for to have
part thereof, or profit by covenant made; and he that doth so, shall be pun-
ished at the King's pleasure., 58 In 1300, 28 Edward 1, chapter 11 extended
49. Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the
Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 35 (1989).
50. See id at 38-39; see also TOOTHMAN & Ross, supra note 1, at 162; ROBERT H.
ARONSON, ATTORNEY-CLIENT FEE ARRANGEMENTS: REGULATION AND REVIEW 77 (Federal
3udicial Center 1910). "England no longer prohibits the use of all coningerti iees ; how-
ever,] their use is still less common than in the United States." See THOMAS D. MORGAN &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 104
(Robert C. Clark et al., 8th ed. 2003). In the United States, the contingent fee is extending
beyond its traditional role in personal injury cases by moving into other professions, such as
real estate brokering and investment banking. Brickman, supra note 49, at 38 n.41.
51. For a more detailed discussion of champerty, see Max Radin, Maintenance by
Champerty, 24 CAL. L. REv. 48 (1935).
52. MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 50, at 104. Arkansas Model Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 1.8 (j) embodies the old common-law rule of champerty stating, "A lawyer
shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the
lawyer is conducting for a client;" however, the rule now provides exceptions for contingent
fees and attorney liens. ARK. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (2003).
53. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 224 (7th ed. 1999).
54. Lytle v. State, 17 Ark. 608, 665 (1857); Bayard v. McLane, 3 Del. 139, 208 (1840).
55. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 965 (7th ed. 1999).
56. Lytle, 17 Ark. at 665.
57. Id.
58. Id. (quoting Statute of Westminister, 1275, 3 Edw. 1, c. 25 (Eng.)). Hosts of other
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the law of champerty to all persons with even higher penalties. 59 Then in
1305 the statute de definitio conspirat outlawed champerty, declaring that
"[c]hampeters be they who move pleas or suits, or cause them to be moved
by their own procurement, or by others, and sue at their proper costs, to
have part of the land in variance, or part of the gains.' ' 6
With the law of champerty defined under English common law,61 the
next section delves into the acceptance and denial of champerty within the
United States.62
2. Denial and Acceptance of Champerty and the Contingent Fee in
the United States
In 1813 Justice Brackenridge said that "parties not monied" would
sometimes choose "to stipulate for something out of what was recover-
able[,]" and attorneys would take "what are called contingent fees., 63 Jus-
tice Brackenridge theorized that the practice of contingent fee use arose
from the scarcity of circulating currency in places like colonial Pennsyl-
vania. 64 While Justice Brackenridge held contingent fees out as tolerated
and common, the earliest reported United States decisions on the subject
held contingent fee contracts to be champertous and void.65 Despite these
officials were prohibited from maintaining champertous suits. Id. at 666 (citing Statute of
Westminister, 1275, 13 Edw. 1, c. 49 (Eng.)).
59. Id. The following exception was seen in 1300, 28 Edward 1, chapter 11: "But it may
not be understood hereby, that any person shall be prohibited to have counsel of pleaders, or
of learned men in law, for his fee; or of his parents and next friends." Bayard, 3 Del. at 210
(quoting Statute of Westminister, 1275, 28 Edw. 1, c. 11 (Eng.)).
60. Lytle, 17 Ark. at 666 (quoting Statute of Westminister, 1275, 33 Edw. 1 (Eng.)). In
1540 after King Henry the Eighth seized the estates of the Knights of Malta and granted the
estates to his courtiers, he confirmed all former statutes against champerty in 38 Henry 8,
chapter 9. Id. at 667.
61. Id. at 666.
62. See infra Part III.A.2.
63. Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of
Contingency Fee Contracts, A History to 1940,47 DEPAUL L. REV. 231, 234 (1998) (quoting
H.H. BRACKENRIDGE, LAW MISCELLANIES (Stanley Katz et al. eds., New York, Amo Press
1972) (1814)).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 234-35. See, e.g., Holloway v. Lowe, 7 Port. 488, 490 (Ala. 1838) (holding
champerty is the illegal maintenance of a suit); Scobey v. Ross, 13 Ind. 117, 119 (1859)
(holding that contingent fees are champertous and void); Rust v. Lame, 14 Ky. 411, 418
(1823) (holding that champerty is an offense at common law); Livingston v. Cornell, 2 Mart
(O.S.) 281, 295 (La. 1812) (holding that any contract where the client agrees to pay the attor-
ney a portion of the object or amount in dispute is null and void); Thurston v. Percival, 18
Mass. 415, 417 (1823) (holding that champertous agreements are void, but the attorney might
still recover in quantum meruit); Backus v. Bryon, 4 Mich. 535, 553 (1857) (holding that it
would shock the sense of professional priority to allow an attorney to advertise that they
would prosecute on a contingency fee basis).
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decisions, however, state high courts began allowing contingent fee con-
tracts.66
It was not until the mid 1800's that some state legislatures allowed the
use of contingent fees by statute. 67 In 1839 the Virginia legislature struck a
blow to the ancient law of champerty stating that attorneys were free to con-
tract fee arrangements with their clientS.68 in 10 49 New York's statutory
enactment of the Field Code repealed statutes regulating lawyers' fees, con-
69tributing significantly to the validation of contingent fees.
By 1884 the United States Supreme Court upheld a contingent fee con-
tract in Taylor v. Bemiss.70 In 1908 the American Bar Association followed
the United States Supreme Court in recognizing the validity of contingent
fee contracts.71 In its recognition the American Bar Association also sought
to regulate contingent fee contracts through its original adoption of Cannon
13,72 which reads as follows: "A contract for a contingent fee, where sanc-
tioned by law, should be reasonable under all circumstances of the case,
including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always
be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness. '73 With fast
66. Karsten, supra note 63, at 239. New York was the earliest to sanction contingency
fee contracts in 1823, but New York was soon joined by Tennessee (1824), Louisiana
(1834), Delaware (1840), Pennsylvania (1852), California (1854), Arkansas (1857), Georgia
(1859), Texas (1860), and Virginia (1870). Id. at 239 n.65.
67. Id. at 240; see also Brickman, supra note 49, at 37; Hughes, supra note 42, at 3.
68. Karsten, supra note 63, at 240.
69. Id. Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated section 16-22-302 has the same effect as the
Virginia and New York statutes, stating, "The compensation of an attorney at law, solicitor,
or counselor for his services is governed by agreement, expressed or implied, which is not
restrained by law." ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-302 (Michie 2003).
70. 110 U.S. 42, 45 (1884). In the case of Wylie v. Coxe, decided in 1854, the Supreme
Court, in dicta, upheld a contingent fee contract whereby the attorney was to receive a stipu-
lated sum of the amount recovered for the prosecution of a claim against the state of Mexico;
but the case was resolved without addressing the contingent fee issue. 56 U.S. 415, 417-20
(1854).
71. Hughes, supra note 42, at 3.
72. Id.
73. CANNONS OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Cannon 13 (1908). Today, Rule 1.5 of the Arkansas
Model Rules of Professional Conduct seeks to broaden the regulation of the contingent fee
contract as follows:
(a) A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in determin-
ing the reasonableness of a fee include the following: ... (8) whether the fee is
fixed or contingent... (c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter
for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is
prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in
writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, includ-
ing the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of
settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the
recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the con-
tingent fee is calculated. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer
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growing acceptance of the contingent fee in the United States,7 states had
no choice but to regulate this new and controversial form of payment.75
B. Evolution and Exploration of the Contingent Fee in Arkansas
In 1857 the Arkansas Supreme Court sanctioned the use of contingent
fees by attorneys, holding that contingent fees did not violate any law of
champerty in the state. 76 By 1878 problems arose concerning the compensa-
tion entitlement of attorneys discharged from a contingent fee contract. 77 In
Brodie v. Watkins, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that when an attorney
has a contract with a client to perform certain services, but is wrongfully
prevented by the client from performing these services and the attorney re-
mains ready to serve, the attorney can claim the entire amount agreed upon,
minus the expenses the attorney would have incurred but not charged to the
client had the attorney completed the agreement. 78 The Brodie court also
reasoned that the attorney "will not be put upon the quantum meruit [;] he
ought not to recover more than he would have made if he had gone on with
the case.",79 Founded upon the common law doctrine of assumpsit, quantum
shall provide the client with a written statement stating the outcome of the mat-
ter and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the
method of its determination. (d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement
for, charge, or collect: (1) any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or
amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the
amount of alimony or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof. Provided,
however, after a final order or decree is entered an attorney may enter into a con-
tingent fee contract for collection of payments which are due pursuant to such
decree or order; or (2) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal
case.
ARK. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2003).
74. Brickman, supra note 49, at 38; see also supra note 66 and accompanying text. In
the middle of the nineteenth century, it was not uncommon for lawyers assisting in collection
matters to collect on a contingent fee basis. Brickman, supra note 49, at 37. It was not until
1965 that Maine became the last state to accept contingent fee contracts between attorney
and client. Id. at 39.
75. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
76. Lytle v. State, 17 Ark. 608, 674 (1857) (holding that an attorney could receive a
portion of disputed lands for work performed and work to be performed, but could only
acquire title for said lands if the suit was successful and that the attorney could pay for the
costs of the suit and not violate the law of champerty); see also Karsten, supra note 63, at
239.
77. Brodie v. Watkins, 33 Ark. 545, 547 (1878).
78. ld.
79. Id. at 548; Berry v. Nichols, 227 Ark. 297, 303, 298 S.W.2d 40, 43 (1957);
Brockman v. Rorex, 212 Ark. 948, 953-54, 208 S.W.2d 991, 995 (1948). Should the client
choose not to continue the action, or if the subsequent attorney recovers nothing, the dis-
charged attorney will recover nothing. Louis A. Etoch, Note, Henry, Walden & Davis v.
Goodman: The Value of a Discharged Attorney's Contingent Fee Contract in Arkansas, 42
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meruit becomes available when a contract is unenforceable.80 To calculate
damages under a quantum meruit recovery, one must measure the value of
the service in the labor market where the party sought the service itself.81 In
Beaumont v. J.H. Hamlen & Son, the court held that if an attorney, without
just cause, abandons a client before the termination of the proceeding or
commits a material breach of the employment contract, the attorney forfeits
all right to compensation. 82 The court reasoned that the contract being entire
requires entire performance in order for the attorney to receive compensa-
tion, because the attorney is in the same position as any person engaged in
rendering an entire service who must fully perform to recover the contracted
amount.83 These cases constitute the early case law development of the con-
tingent fee in Arkansas.84
The next major development involving recovery on a contingent fee
contract was the Attorney's Lien Law originally enacted in 194185 and to-
day contained in Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated sections 16-22-301-
304, whereby an attorney can place a lien on the proceeds of his or her cli-
ARK. L. REv. 549, 552 (1989). For a discussion on quantum meruit, see infra notes 90-92
and accompanying text.
80. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 576-83 (2d ed. 1993).
81. Id. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of attorney's fees
not specifically fixed by contract are determined on a case-by-case basis examining the at-
torney's skill and experience, the parties' relationship, difficulty of services, extent of the
litigation, the time and labor devoted to the cause, and the results obtained. Robinson v.
Champion, 251 Ark. 817, 818-19, 475 S.W.2d 677, 678 (1972). The Arkansas Model Rules
of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5 also contains considerations in determining reasonableness
of attorney fees:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions in-
volved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) the like-
lihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment
will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged
in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results
obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the
experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the ser-
vices; and (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
ARK. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5. Additionally, Arkansas Code of 1987 Anno-
tated section 16-22-305 provides that the attorney will satisfy any unnecessary costs. ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-22-305 (Michie 2003).
82. 190 Ark 630, 632, 81 S.W.2d 24, 25 (1935).
83. Id., 81 S.W.2d at 25. To allow a discharged attorney to collect the entire fee without
providing all of or a substantial amount of the services contemplated in the contract violates
the intentions of the Code of Professional Responsibility that an attorney should only collect
an earned fee. Laura A. Smith, Recent Development, O'Rourke v. Cairns: The Louisiana
Supreme Court Modifies the Quantum Meruit Test Used to Allocate Fees to Attorneys Fired
for Cause From Contingency Fee Arrangements, 71 TuL. L. REv. 1835, 1838 (1997).
84. See supra notes 76-79, 82, 83 and accompanying text.
85. 1941 Ark. Acts 59 & 306.
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ent's cause of action, claim, or counterclaim to recover payment due for
services related to the action or claim. 86 The Arkansas Supreme Court has
interpreted the Attorney's Lien Law many times since its enactment.87 The
most significant of these cases is Henry, Walden & Davis v. Goodman, in
which the Arkansas Supreme Court examined the legislative intent behind
the Attorney's Lien Law. 88 In Goodman, the court, contrary to its prior deci-
sions, 89 held that an "attorney is limited to a quantum meruit recovery for
the reasonable value of his [or her] or her services." 90 One of the reasons
given by the court for this decision was the preservation of the client's right
to discharge his or her attorney because holding a client liable to a dis-
charged attorney for a contingent fee contract would impede upon the right
of a client to discharge his or her attorney. 9' Another reason given by the
86. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-22-301-304 (Michie 2003).
87. Lancaster v. Fitzhugh, 310 Ark. 590, 592, 839 S.W.2d 192, 193 (1992) (holding that
an attorney can recover from third persons under the Attorney Lien Statue); Cato v. Ark.
Mun. League Health Benefit Fund, 285 Ark. 419, 424, 688 S.W.2d 720, 723 (1985) (holding
that the attorney may proceed against his former client or any or all of the parties litigant to
collect his or her fee); Myers v. Muuss, 281 Ark. 188, 192, 662 S.W.2d 805, 807-08 (1984)
(holding that a court may award a fee under this statute even though no monetary remunera-
tion is given); Slayton v. Russ, 205 Ark. 474, 478, 169 S.W.2d 571, 573-74 (1943) (holding
that a reasonable fee is not necessarily limited by the amount of the settlement).
88. 294 Ark. 25, 741 S.W.2d 233 (1987).
89. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
90. Goodman, 294 Ark. at 32, 741 S.W.2d at 236. The court traced the reasoning of the
California Supreme Court decision in Fracasse v. Brent. Id., 741 S.W.2d at 236 (citing Fra-
casse v. Brent, 6 Cal.3d 784, 494 P.2d 9 (1972)).
91. Id., 741 S.W.2d at 236. Allowing the discharged attorney to recover in quantum
meruit does not inhibit a client's right to discharge his or her attorney. Id., 741 S.W.2d at
236. A client has the right to discharge an attorney even without just cause. Sikes v. Segers,
266 Ark. 654, 660, 587 S.W.2d 554, 557 (1979); Lessenberry v. Adkinsson, 255 Ark. 285,
294-95, 499 S.W.2d 835, 840 (1973). Rule 1.16 of the Arkansas Rules of Professional Con-
duct covers the declination or termination of representation:
(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or,
where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of
a client if; (1) the representation will result in violation of the rules of profes-
sional conduct or other law; (2) the lawyer's physical or mental condition mate-
rially impairs the lawyer's ability to represent the client; or (3) the lawyer is dis-
charged. (b) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from rep-
resenting a client if withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse
effect on the interests of the client, or if: (1) the client persists in a course of ac-
tion involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is crimi-
nal or fraudulent; (2) the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a
crime or fraud; (3) a client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer
considers repugnant or imprudent; (4) the client fails substantially to fulfill an
obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer's services and has been given rea-
sonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled;
(5) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the law-
yer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or (6) other good
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court for its decision is that an attorney has a right to compensation for work
performed, and the court ruled that this compensation would come in the
form of quantum meruit.92 The court's holding in Goodman, establishing
quantum meruit as the sole basis for an attorney's recovery for services ren-
dered, was short lived.93
In 1989, in the first legislative session following the Goodman deci-
sion, the legislature expressly rejected the holding of Goodman in Arkansas
Code of 1987 Annotated section 16-22-301, which provides that an attorney
"should have the right to rely on his contract with his client; and that the
Attorney's Lien Law should be reenacted to protect the contractual rights of
attorneys." 94 Moreover, the lien law still recognizes the attorney's right to
recover in quantum meruit in lieu of recovery on the contract because Ar-
kansas Code of 1987 Annotated section 16-22-303(b)(1) expressly states
that an attorney's recovery "shall not be necessarily limited to the amount, if
any, of the compromise settlement between the parties litigant." 95 The legis-
cause for withdrawal exists. (c) When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer
shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the
representation. (d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps
to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel,
surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding
any advance payment of fee that has not been earned. The lawyer may retain pa-
pers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law.
ARK. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2003).
92. Goodman, 294 Ark. at 30, 741 S.W.2d at 236. Quantum meruit means "as much as
he has deserved." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 1255 (7th ed. 1999). Quantum meruit, tradi-
tionally used to secure compensation for work performed, derived from equity. Judy Beckner
Sloan, Quantum Meruit: Residual Equity in Law, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 399, 401 (1992).
93. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-301 (Michie 2003). Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated
section 16-22-301 reads as follows:
It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Ar-
kansas that the Supreme Court, in Henry, Walden, and Davis v. Goodman, 294
Ark. 25 (1987), limited the existing Attorney's Lien Law by allowing only a
quantum meruit recovery in a case in which the attorney was dismissed by the
client; that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Attorney Lien Law is con-
trary to what was intended by the enactment of Acts 59 and 306 of 1941, the At-
torney Lien Law; that an attorney should have the right to rely on his contract
with his client; and that the Attorney's Lien Law should be reenacted to protect
the contractual rights of attorneys. Therefore, it is the intent of §§ 16-22-302-16-
22-304 to allow an attorney to obtain a lien for services based on his or her
agreement with his or her client and to provide for compensation in case of a set-
tlement or compromise without the consent of the attorney.
Id.
94. Id. Under the reenacted Attorney's Lien Law, if a client discharges an attorney
retained on a contingent fee contract and hires another attorney on a contingent fee basis, the
client will have to pay a contingent fee to both attorneys in the event of an award or settle-
ment. Id.
95. Id. § 16-22-303(b)(1) (Michie 2003). For a discussion on allowing recovery beyond
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lature's reenactment of the Attorney's Lien Law in Arkansas Code of 1987
Annotated section 16-22-301 also has constitutional implications because
the law appears to violate the separation of powers in the Arkansas Consti-
tution by infringing upon the Arkansas Supreme Court's power to regulate
the legal profession.96 The court responded to this issue when it stated, "The
General Assembly, by repeating its statement in the lien law that an attor-
ney-client contract governs the attorney's right to a fee, has not altered the
common law.. . ."97 Even so, the statute, as reenacted by the legislature, is
still being upheld.98 Despite the reenactment of the lien law and the legisla-
ture's rejection of the Goodman ruling, the Arkansas Supreme Court has
breathed life back into the Goodman holding in Crockett & Brown, P.A. v.
Courson.
99
In Crockett, the court held that the statutory lien is not available to an
attorney discharged with cause and recovery is limited to quantum meruit,
but attorneys dismissed without cause are entitled to recover under the At-
torney's Lien Law' 00 in either quantum meruit or on the contract.10 1
This note addresses the most recent issue to arise in the Arkansas con-
tingent fee arena, which is "[w]hether an attorney who enters into a contin-
gent-fee contract with a client and is later discharged by the client may
bring an action for a quantum-meruit fee prior to the resolution of the for-
the contract price, see Lester Brickman Setting the Fee When the Client Discharges a Con-
tingent Fee Attorney, 41 EMORY L.J. 367, 382 (1992).
96. ARK. CONST. amend. XXVIII; see also HOWARD W. BRILL, ARKANSAS
PROFESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL Ercs 100 (3d ed. 1994).
97. Lancaster v. Fitzhugh, 310 Ark. 590, 594, 839 S.W.2d 192, 194 (1992).
98. McDermott v. McDermott, 336 Ark. 557, 565, 986 S.W.2d 843, 847 (1999).
99. 314 Ark. 578, 864 S.W.2d 244 (1993).
100. Id. at 581, 864 S.W.2d at 245; Finnegan v. Johnson, 326 Ark. 586, 587, 932 S.W.2d
344, 345 (1996); Williams v. Ashley, 319 Ark. 197, 199, 890 S.W.2d 260, 260-61 (1995). In
Arkansas, what is sufficient "cause" to discharge an attorney remains an elusive concept.
Linda Ann Reid, Note, Crockett and Brown, P.A. v. Courson: Determining the Fee of an
Attorney Discharged "For Cause, "47 ARK. L. REv. 725, 743 (1994). In Goodman the court
did offer some clues as to what is sufficient cause to discharge an attorney when it stated,
"The relationship between the attorney and his client must be based upon the utmost trust
and confidence, and if that basis has been substantially undermined, the relationship should
be terminated." Henry v. Goodman, 294 Ark. 25, 31, 741 S.W.2d 233, 236 (1987). The Ar-
kansas Supreme Court in Williams found the client had cause to discharge her attorney when
she indicated her attorney was unable to communicate with her. Williams, 319 Ark. at 200,
890 S.W.2d at 261-62. The California Supreme Court held that when a "client has, for what-
ever reason, lost faith in the attorney" this is sufficient to establish cause for discharge. Fra-
casse v. Brent, 6 Cal.3d 784, 790, 494 P.2d 9, 13 (1972). Some scholars have suggested
using the Rules of Professional Conduct as a guide to determine cause. Reid, supra, at 744-
45. In Orsini v. Larry Moyer Trucking, Inc., however, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that
"[t]he rules are not designed for a basis of civil liability, but are to provide guidance to law-
yers." 310 Ark. 179, 184, 833 S.W.2d 366, 369 (1992).
101. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
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mer client's lawsuit." 10 2 There is a split of authority on how to resolve this
issue; the two predominate approaches are known as the New York and
California rules. 1
03
C. The New York and California Rules'
0 4
The New York rule, as set forth in Tillman v. Komar,'W states that on
the client's termination of a contingent fee contract, the cause of action for
the reasonable value of services, in quantum meruit, immediately accrues to
the attorney. 10 6 This holding has its roots in earlier court decisions that held
that the statute of limitations against a claim for services begins to run at the
termination of the services or after the performance of the final service.'07
The California rule, as set forth in Fracasse v. Brent,108 states that the
cause of action of a discharged attorney against a client for compensation of
services rendered under a contingent fee contract does not accrue unless and
until the occurrence of the stated contingency. 0 9 In the 1889 case of Bartlett
v. Odd-Fellows' Savings Bank,"0 the California Supreme Court set forth the
groundwork for Fracasse" holding that the statute of limitations for an
attorney discharged without cause on a contingent fee contract begins to run
upon the receipt of money by the client. 1 2 Almost forty years later in
Tracey v. MacIntyre, a California Court of Appeals,"
3 citing Tillman," 4
ruled that an attorney could immediately bring suit after discharge and be-
102. Salmon v. Atkinson, 355 Ark. 325, 326, 137 S.W.3d 383 (2003).
103. Id.
104. For a more complete discussion on the reasoning and policies behind these rules, see
infra Part IV.A.
105. 181 N.E. 75 (N.Y. 1932).
W6. Id. at 76. Cases follo-wing ithe New Ywk mre indrlde" In re Estalt of Calrahan, 53?,
N.E.2d 985, 987 (Il1. 1991); Skeens v. Miller, 628 A.2d 185, 191 (Md. 1993); Adkin Plumb-
ing & Heating Supply Co. v. Harwell, 606 A.2d 802, 804 (N.H. 1992); Trenti, Saxhaug,
Berger, Roche, Stephenson, Richards & Aluni, Ltd., v. Nartnik, 439 N.W.2d 418, 420 (Minn.
App. 1989).
107. Martin v. Camp, 114 N.E. 46, 49 (N.Y. 1916); Eliot v. Lawton, 89 Mass. 274, 276
(1863); Powers v. Manning, 28 N.E. 290, 292 (Mass. 1891); Adams v. Fort Plain Bank, 36
N.Y 255, 260 (1867); Bathgate v. Haskin, 59 N.Y. 533, 535 (1875).
108. 494 P.2d 9, 14 (Cal. 1972).
109. Id. Cases following the California Rule include: Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So.2d
1016, 1022 (Fla. 1982); Plaza Shoe Store, Inc. v. Hermel, Inc., 636 S.W.2d 53, 60 (Mo.
1982); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Tulsa v. Bassett, 83 P.2d 837, 840 (Okla. 1938);
Clerk of Superior Ct. of Gilford County v. Gilford Builders Supply Co., Inc., 361 S.E.2d 115,
118 (N.C. App. 1987).
110. 21 P. 743 (Cal. 1889).
111. Fracasse, 494 P.2d at 9.
112. Bartlett, 21 P. at 744.
113. 84 P.2d 526 (Cal. Ct. App. 1938).
114. Tillman v. Komar, 259 N.Y. 133, 181 N.E. 75 (1932).
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fore the occurrence of the contingency.' 5 In the fifties and sixties, however,
the California courts followed their prior decision in Bartlett.16 In 1972
Fracasse affirmed those cases and delivered the rule set forth above, over-
ruling any cases to the contrary, specifically the 1938 Tracey decision of the
California Court of Appeals.
11 7
The Arkansas Supreme Court in Salmon v. Atkinson considered both
the New York and California rules in formulating a holding." 8
IV. REASONING
A. Majority Opinion
The court decided the case of Salmon v. Atkinson on December 11,
2003, and Justice Donald L. Corbin wrote the majority opinion.19 The Ar-
kansas Supreme Court found its jurisdiction to be proper under Arkansas
Supreme Court Rule 1-2(b)(1) because the case presented an issue of first
impression.1 20 The court framed the issue as follows: "Whether an attorney
who enters into a contingent-fee contract with a client and is later dis-
charged by the client may bring an action for a quantum meruit fee prior to
the resolution of the former client's lawsuit.'
' 2'
Although this was a case of first impression, the Arkansas Supreme
Court had consistently held that a discharged attorney may recover for the
reasonable value of his or her services even though the parties originally
entered into a contingent fee contract. 22 The court reasoned that the client is
responsible to pay reasonable attorney fees when the attorney has conferred
a benefit upon the client.1 23 The court stated that "[t]he question in this case
is not whether the discharged attorney may recover a quantum meruit fee,
but whether recovery of such a fee is dependent upon the contingency origi-
nally agreed to in the contract." 
1 24
115. Tracey, 84 P.2d at 528.
116. Bartlett, 21 P. at 743; Brown v. Connolly, 2 Cal. App. 3d 867 (1969); Jones v.
Marin, 256 P.2d 905 (1953).
117. 494 P.2d 9, 14-15 (1972).
118. 355 Ark. 325, 328, 137 S.W.3d 383, 385 (2003).
119. 355 Ark. at 325-26, 137 S.W.3d at 383.
120. 355 Ark. at 326; ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2 (b)(1).
121. Salmon, 355 Ark. at 326, 137 S.W.3d at 383.
122. Id. at 328 (citing Crockett & Brown, P.A. v. Courson, 312 Ark. 363, 849 S.W.2d
938 (1993); Lancaster v. Fitzhugh, 310 Ark. 590, 839 S.W.2d 192 (1992); Henry, Walden, &
Davis v. Goodman, 294 Ark. 25, 741 S.W.2d 233 (1987)).
123. Id., 137 S.W.3d at 385.
124. Id., 137 S.W.3d at 385.
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There is a split of authority among the states on this issue.' 25 One fac-
tion follows the California rule, which states that the cause of action for a
discharged attorney does not accrue unless and until the happening of the
stated contingency. 126 The California rule bars a discharged attorney from
recovering any fee if the client does not recover on the principal matter,
regardless of whether the client discharges the attorney -with or without
cause. 127
The other school of thought follows the New York rule, which states
that the cause of action for a discharged attorney accrues immediately upon
discharge and is not dependent upon the discharging client's recovery.
129
Courts follow the New York rule for two primary reasons. 29 First, when a
client terminates a contingent fee contract by discharging his or her attor-
ney, the contract no longer exists and the contingency term is no longer
effective. 30 When a client terminates a contract, the client cannot use the
terms of the contract to prevent the attorney from recovering in quantum
meruit.13 The second primary reason for following the New York rule is the
belief that forcing a discharged attorney to wait for the occurrence of a con-
tingency is unfair and goes beyond the scope of what the parties contem-
plated when contracting. 132 The Arkansas Supreme Court believed that the
New York Court of Appeals best articulated this proposition when it stated,
"The value of one attorney's services is not measured by the result attained
by another. This one did not contract for his contingent compensation on the
hypothesis of success or failure by some other member of the bar."'133 The
125. Id., 137 S.W.3d at 385.
126. Id., 137 S.W.3d at 385 (citing Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1972); Rosenberg
v. Levin, 409 So.2d 1016 (Fla. 1982); Plaza Shoe Stores, Inc. v. Hermiel, Inc., 636 S.W.2d 53
(Mo. t982); First Nat't Bank & Trust Co. of Tulsa v. Bassett, 83 Pf2d 837 (Okla. 1938);
Clerk of Superior Ct. of Gilford County v. Gilford Builders Supply Co., Inc., 361 S.E.2d 115
(N.C. Ct. App. 1987)).
127. Salmon, 355 Ark. at 328, 137 S.W.3d at 385.
128. Id. at 329, 137 S.W.3d at 385 (citing Tillman v. Komar, 181 N.E. 75 (N.Y. 1932); In
re Estate of Callahan, 578 N.9.2d 985 (I11. 1991); Skeens v. Miller, 628 A.2d 185 (Md.
1993); Adkin Plumbing & Heating Supply Co. Inc., v. Harwell, 606 A.2d 802, (N.H. 1992);
Trenti, Saxhaug, Berger, Roche, Stephenson, Richards & Aluni, Ltd., v. Nartnik, 439
N.W.2d 418 (Minn. App. 1989)).
129. Id., 137 S.W.3d at 385.
130. Id., 137 S.W.3d at 385. The New York Court of Appeals reasoned that the contract
either wholly stands or it totally falls. Tillman, 181 N.E. at 75.
131. Salmon, 355 Ark. at 329, 137 S.W.3d at 385. "A client cannot terminate the agree-
ment and then resurrect the contingency term when the discharged attorney files a claim."
Estate of Callahan, 578 N.E.2d at 988.
132. Salmon, 355 Ark. at 329, 137 S.W.3d at 385.
133. Id., 137 S.W.3d at 385 (quoting Tillman, 181 N.E. at 76). The New York Court of
Appeals in Tillman additionally stated:
In making their agreement, the parties may be deemed to have estimated this
lawyer's pecuniary merit according to his own character, temperament, energy,
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court also gave an additional reason for following the New York rule, ex-
plained by the Illinois Supreme Court as follows:
[Q]uantum meruit is based on the implied promise of a recipient
of services to pay for those services which are of value to him.
The recipient would be unjustly enriched if he were able to retain
the services without paying for them. The claimant's recovery
here should not be linked to a contract contingency when his re-
covery is not based upon the contract, but upon quantum me-
ruit.
34
The Arkansas Supreme Court believed that the New York rule was the
superior rule, and in applying the New York rule to the facts of Salmon, the
court held that the trial court did not err in awarding a quantum meruit fee to
discharged attorneys Virginia Atkinson and James Howell. 35 The court
briefly restated the evidence in the case and, based upon that evidence, held
that Atkinson's and Howell's cause of action to recover reasonable attor-
ney's fees accrued immediately upon their discharge by Salmon.3 6 Thus,
the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. 1
37
B. Concurring Opinion
Justice Annabelle Imber concurred that the court was correct in affirm-
ing the trial court, but she felt that the court was correct because Salmon
offered no convincing argument or citation to authority in her Appellate
Brief for reversal. 38 Furthermore, Justice Imber, while agreeing with the
majority's decision, wrote a concurrence because she felt that the majority's
zeal, education, knowledge and experience which are the important factors con-
tributing to his professional status and constituting in a large degree, when
viewed in relation to the volume of work performed and the result accomplished,
a fair standard for gauging the value of services as prudent counsel and skillful
advocate.
Tillman, 181 N.E. at 76.
134. Salmon, 355 Ark. at 330, 137 S.W.3d at 386 (quoting In re Estate of Callahan, 578
N.E.2d at 988).
135. Salmon, 355 Ark. at 330, 137 S.W.3d at 386.
136. Id. at 330-31, 137 S.W.3d at 386. The court stated that it had taken notice of a cli-
ent's right to discharge his or her attorney but did not believe that the holding in this case
impaired that right. Id. at 331, 137 S.W.3d at 386. The court went on to say that it had "pre-
viously determined that the client's right to discharge the attorney is not comprised by allow-
ing th~e dischaygeda?.tonmey to icovex in qantuim mtr~ai." Id., 137 S.W.3d at 3896. In inal
footnote, the court retraced prior Arkansas legislation and Arkansas Supreme Court decisions
in the area of attorneys' contingent fees. Id. at 331 n.1, 137 S.W.3d at 386 n.1. For a com-
plete discussion on this area of the law, see supra Part III.B.
137. Salmon, 355 Ark. at 331, 137 S.W.3d at 386.
138. Id., 137 S.W.3d at 387 (Imber, J., concurring).
2004]
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holding was too broad.139 "A fair reading of the majority opinion could deny
... a client the option of dropping a suit," and that result would strike at the
heart of the attorney-client relationship.
40
Justice Imber restated the issue of the case, as framed by the majority,
but held out the facts of this case, i.e., that Salmon, after discharging her
attorneys, moved on with her suit using the discharged attorneys' work
product.141 Justice Imber agreed with the New York rule in that it is unfair
for a discharged attorney to wait on the occurrence of a contingency before
receiving payment for services rendered.142 Justice Imber felt, however, that
the majority's blanket holding went too far because it was not narrowly
tailored to the facts of the case.' 43 In the present case, Salmon discharged
her attorneys without cause and used their work product to support her suit
pro se.' 44 It would be unfair to require the discharged attorneys to base their
compensation on Salmon's abilities to competently represent herself'
45
What if Salmon had decided to drop the suit for "illness, or stress, or a
change of heart?"' 146 The majority's opinion would require a client to con-
tinue a suit they no longer wanted to pursue in order to avoid paying quan-
tum meruit fees that could reach into the hundreds of thousands. 47 This
would in effect become the attorney's suit because the only person the suit
would benefit is the attorney counting on the contingent fee. 148 This circum-
stance would violate at least two of the Arkansas Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct.149 First, rule 1.2(a) states, "A lawyer shall abide by a cli-
ent's decisions concerning the objectives of representation. ' 5 Second, rule
1.8(j) states, "A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause
of action or subject matter of litigation . . .except that a lawyer may...
contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.
139. Id., 137 S.W.3d at 387 (Imber, J., concurring).
140. Id., 137 S.W.3d at 387 (Imber, J., concurring).
141. Id., 137 S.W.3d at 387 (Imber, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 331-32, 137 S.W.3d at 387. The concurring opinion goes on to cite Tillman v.
Kamar, 181 N.E. 75, 76 (N.Y. 1932), where the New York Court of Appeals reasoned that
the attorney did not contract to have the value of his or her services measured by the success
of another member of the bar. Id. at 332, 137 S.W.3d at 387 (Imber, J., concurring).
143. Salmon, 355 Ark. at 332, 137 S.W.3d at 387 (Imber, J., concurring).
144. Id., 137 S.W.3d at 387 (Imber, J., concurring).
145. Id., 137 S.W.3d at 387 (Imber, J., concurring). Justice Imber further reasoned that it
was Salmon's decision to fire her attorneys, take their work, and proceed forward. Id, 137
S.W.3d at 387 (Imber, J., concurring).
146. Id., 137 S.W.3d at 387 (Imber, J., concurring).
147. Id., 137 S.W.3d at 387 (Imber, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 332, 137 S.W.3d at 388 (Imber, J., concurring).
149. Salmon, 355 Ark. at 332, 137 S.W.3d at 388 (Imber, J., concurring).
150. Id., 137 S.W.3d at 388 (Imber, J., concurring) (quoting ARK. MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2003)).
151. Id. at 333, 137 S.W.3d at 388 (Imber, J., concurring) (quoting ARK. MODEL RULES
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Justice Imber stated that under the majority holding, an attorney is al-
ways entitled to a quantum meruit fee when discharged from a contingent
fee contract.1 52 The effect is that poor clients without the funds to pay such a
fee must continue a lawsuit that they would rather drop. Rule 1.2(a) is thus
violated. 53 Additionally, an attorney who pursues a suit for the sole reason
of securing a contingent fee, violates the letter and spirit of rule 1.8(j) be-
cause only the attorney's proprietary interest is driving the suit.' 54 "Even
though rule 1.8(j) allows an attorney to have a proprietary interest in a con-
tingent outcome," Justice Imber does not believe that the fee should be the
sole reason for the suit.'
55
Moreover, what about the attorney discharged for cause? 156 Justice Im-
ber noted that the majority's opinion did not distinguish between attorneys
discharged with or without cause, and the Arkansas Supreme Court's prece-
dent has never required a client in a contingent fee contract to pay a fee to
an attorney discharged with cause unless and until there is a recovery, and if
there is a recovery, the fee is based on quantum meruit.1
57
Justice Imber agreed with the tajority that when a client discharges
his or her attorney without cause, breaching the contingent fee agreement,
and pursues "the suit pro se or with the benefit of another attorney's ser-
vices," the discharged attorney "is entitled to a quantum meruit fee for ser-
vices rendered.' 58 Justice Imber also agreed with the majority that an attor-
ney discharged without cause should not wait for the client's recovery to
receive a fee, "but the fee should be due immediately if the client proceeds
forward with the suit."'
' 59
In Justice Imber's view, however, the majority's holding would force
poor clients who cannot afford an hourly fee to continue litigation when
they would prefer to drop the suit.' 60 "It is true that attorneys who contract
on contingency-fee cases may" recover nothing, "but that is a risk those
attorneys take for the chance to receive a percentage of a large settlement or
damages award.' 161 Low income Arkansans are the ones who will suffer
from this holding; while they might be willing to enter into a contingent fee
contract, they will decide "not to pursue lawsuits at all for fear they will be
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.86)).
152. Id., 137 S.W.3d at 388 (Imber, J., concurring).
153. Id., 137 S.W.3d at 388 (Imber, J., concurring).
154. Id., 137 S.W.3d at 388 (Imber, J., concurring).
155. Salmon, 355 Ark. 333, 137 S.W.3d at 388 (lImber, J., concurring).
156. Id., 137 S.W.3d at 388 (Imber, J., concurring).
157. Id., 133 S.W.3d -at 3-,- klmbeT, I., ozrring) ;,i'ng Cvrckett & Bl3vaw, P.A. ..
Courson, 312 Ark. 363, 849 S.W.2d 938 (1993)).
158. Id. at 333-34, 137 S.W.3d at 388 (Imber, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 334, 137 S.W.3d at 388 (Imber, J., concurring).
160. Id., 137 S.W.3d at 388 (Imber, J., concurring).
161. Salmon, 355 Ark. 333, 137 S.W.3d at 388 (Imber, J., concurring).
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forced into financial ruin if they need to drop their lawsuit for some unfore-
seeable reason."'
162
Justice Imber reiterated that she concurred with the result because
Salmon provided no argument or authority for reversal of the trial court, but
she restated her disagreement with the majority's blanket holding.
63
V. SIGNIFICANCE
The case of Salmon v. Atkinson creates new law in the arena of contin-
gent fees, allowing attorneys discharged with or without cause an immediate
cause of action in quantum meruit for the value of services rendered.'64 This
section outlines an Arkansas attorney's right of recovery when discharged
from a contingent fee contract in light of the court's ruling in Salmon. This
section then discusses the ramifications of the Arkansas Supreme Court's
ruling in Salmon, focusing on the Arkansas Model Rules of Professional
Conduct and Arkansans's access to the courts. Finally, this section presents
a proposed rule that will attempt to alleviate the problematic ramifications
of the Salmon decision.
The ruling in Salmon expanded an attorney's avenues of recovery
when discharged from a contingent fee contract. 65 Currently, an attorney
discharged without cause from a contingent fee contract may recover in
quantum meruit immediately upon discharge, 166 or the attorney may wait
until a recovery is had by the client and then the attorney may recover on
the contract.1 67 An attorney discharged from a contingent fee contract for
cause may only recover in quantum meruit,' 68 but the cause of action to
recover a quantum meruit fee accrues immediately upon discharge. 169 While
the rule of law on this issue appears to be sound on its face, it is not without
flaws.
The court's holding in Salmon violates the Arkansas Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. Rule 1.2(a) states, "A lawyer shall abide by a client's
decisions concerning the objectives of representation."'' 70 Under the court's
holding, an attorney is always entitled to a quantum meruit fee after dis-
charge, thereby forcing clients to continue suits they would rather drop be-
cause they cannot afford to pay attorneys' fees and thus violating rule 1.2(a)
162. Id., 137 S.W.3d at 388 (Imber, J., concurring).
163. Id., 137 S.W.3d at 388-89 (Imber, J., concurring).
164. Id., at 330-31, 137 S.W.3d at 386.
165. Id., 137 S.W.3d at 386.
166. Id., 137 S.W.3d at 386.
167. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-301 (Michie 2003).
168. Crockett & Brown, PA. v. Courson, 314 Ark. 578, 581, 864 S.W.2d 244, 245
(1993).
169. Salmon, 355 Ark. at 330-31, 137 S.W.3d at 386.
170. ARK. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2003).
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because the lawyer is not abiding by the client's objectives in that the client
is only continuing the suit for fear of financial ruin.171 Salmon also violates
rule 1.8(j), which states, "A lawyer shall not acquire a propriety interest in
the cause of action. '172 If a client would rather drop the suit but cannot for
fear of financial ruin, then the suit's only purpose is to obtain a contingent
fee for the attorney, violating the spirit and letter of 1.8().'73 Rule 1.8(j)
allows an attorney to acquire a contingent interest in a cause of action, 174 but
surely the drafters of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct did not in-
tend for an attorney's contingent interest to be the sole reason for the suit.
Another more frightening ramification of the court's decision in
Salmon is that it potentially limits access to the courts for all but the
wealthiest Arkansans who are able to pay an hourly or set fee for legal ser-
vices. This holding could compel Arkansans willing to contract on a contin-
gent fee basis to decide not to pursue a suit for fear of financial ruin if they
have to drop their suit for an unforeseen reason. This result would strike at
the primary justification of contingent fees as "the poor man's key to the
courthouse."1
75
These negative consequences could be overcome with a more pointed
rule to address contingency fees, and the following proposal provides such a
rule. When a client discharges an attorney without cause and pursues the
suit pro se or with another attorney, the discharged attorney's cause of ac-
tion immediately accrues and recovery may be had in quantum meruit or the
attorney may forgo the right to recover in quantum meruit to recover on the
contract; however, when a client wholly drops a suit, 176 the client owes
nothing to the attorney who is discharged without cause, unless the client
made a misrepresentation to the attorney that induced the attorney to ini-
tially take the case. Then the attorney may recover in quantum meruit.
While there is a risk that an attorney may recover nothing, this is a risk that
171. Salmon, 355 Ark. at 333, 137 S.W.3d at 388 (Imber, J., concurring). The holding in
Salmon restricts the operation of rule 1.16(a)(3) in that it limits the client's right to discharge
his or her attorney. See ARK. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)( 3). The holding
in Salmon also runs contrary to prior Arkansas Supreme Court decisions ii that it limits the
client's right to discharge his or her attorney. Sikes v. Segers, 266 Ark. 654, 660, 587 S.W.2d
554, 557 (1979); Lessenberry v. Adkissen, 255 Ark. 285, 294-95, 499 S.W.2d 835, 840
(1973).
172. ARK. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.80).
173. Id.
t74. Id.
175. TOOTHMAN AND Ross, supra note 1, at 159.
176. For the purposes of the proposed rule, a client wholly drops a suit when the statute
of limitations on the cause of action in question has run and the client has taken no further
action in the matter. It is the responsibility of the discharged attorney to determine if the
former client has wholly dropped the suit.
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an attorney must take for the opportunity to receive a percentage of a large
settlement or award. 1
77
An attorney discharged with cause should collect no fee unless and un-
til there is a recovery by the client, and then the recovery is limited to quan-
tum meruit. Whether discharged with or without cause, an attorney's quan-
tum meruit recovery should not exceed recovery under the contract. 178 This
proposed rule strives to balance both the interests of Arkansans's clients and
their attorneys.
The Arkansas Supreme Court should reconsider its holding in Salmon,
making the appropriate changes in the law to avoid placing attorneys in a
position to violate the rules that govern their profession and to place the




177. Contingent fee attorneys typically earn between twenty-five to thirty percent more
per hour than if they billed at an hourly rate. TOOTHMAN AND Ross, supra note 1, at 162.
178. The Arkansas Supreme Court has allowed a quantum meruit recovery greater than
the contracted amount. Jarboe v. Hicks, 281 Ark. 21, 22-25, 660 S.W.2d 930, 931-32 (1983)
(awarding a fee of $750 when the settlement was for $1000 and the contingent fee contract
called for a forty percent recovery); Slayton v. Russ, 205 Ark. 474, 475-79, 169 S.W.2d 571,
571-73 (1943) (awarding a fee of $318.54 when the case was settled for $50); St. Louis S.W.
Ry. v. Poe, 201 Ark. 93, 94-96,143 S.W.2d 879, 879-80 (1940) (awarding a fee of $1500
when the settlement was for $1000 and the contingent fee contract called for a fifty percent
recovery).
179. The Arkansas Supreme Court alone cannot accomplish these goals; the Arkansas
Legislature will have to refrain from placing statutory roadblocks in the court's path.
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